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radical right-Wing Parties in Central Europe:  
Mutual Contacts and Cooperation
Pavla Dočekalová
abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse mutual contacts between and co-
operation of the strongest extreme right-wing political parties in Central European 
countries, i.e. in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The article 
defines the extreme right, introduces its member parties in the region (those who had 
or still have parliamentary representation, namely the Association for the Republic 
– the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, Hungarian Truth and Life Party, League of 
Polish Families and the Slovak National Party) and analyses what kind of bilateral or 
multilateral relations they have maintained. It explains the possibilities of and obsta-
cles to the transnational cooperation of the Central European radical right. Special 
emphasis is placed on European Union structures and the question of whether EU 
membership has influenced the mutual contacts of these parties. The conclusion states 
that although radical right political parties have maintained mutual relations, these 
links have been rather limited. The main reason can be found in the very nature of the 
radical right: its ideology is based on nationalism, which means that these parties 
do not consider international cooperation beneficial. Furthermore, they often have 
contradictory interests and aims, and these parties are heterogeneous and prefer dif-
ferent strategies for transnational  cooperation. 
Key words: extreme right; Central Europe; transnational cooperation; political 
parties; party family
introduction
The activities of political parties that are situated on the far right of the political 
spectrum can be considered as one of the challenges to democracy and democratic 
governance. Obviously, this statement is valid for all democratic countries, and the 
Central European region is no exception, but radical right-wing parties differ in their 
and strength in various countries. In some the extreme right has gained parliamentary 
representation and even has become part of the executive. Such parties usually do 
not advocate total elimination of democratic systems, but they express certain ideas 
and attitudes that undermine the democratic system and are a clear contradiction of 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Central European Political Science Association 
Regional Conference, Bratislava, Slovakia, 18–19 May 2006.
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democratic values. Radical right-wing parties do not only focus on activities within 
the arena of national, regional and local politics, but they also participate in European 
elections and seek representation in the European Parliament (EP). This supranational 
platform then provides a forum for cooperation of groups of ideologically alike politi-
cal parties of different countries. 
The aim of this article is to analyse mutual relations between radical right-wing 
political parties in the Central European region and the influence of European Union 
(EU) accession on these relations.  Several questions are considered: do the radical 
right-wing parties in Central Europe maintain mutual contacts? Do they establish a 
common platform for cooperation? Has European Union membership increased their 
interactions? 
There are several aspects of the topic of this text that need to be specified. The 
first is the geographical delimitation: for the purpose of this study, Central Europe 
is understood as the group of ”Visegrád Four” countries (i.e. the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), which have experienced certain similarities in their 
developments. Secondly, it is necessary to explain which radical right-wing parties are 
being analysed. This article deals only with the strongest representatives of the radical 
right: only those parties that were represented (or are still represented) in parliament 
are considered. This limitation is in accordance with the aim of this article explained 
above: to analyse to what extent the radical right in Central Europe has made use of 
the potential for cooperation offered by European integration structures.  The study of 
small parties that have never attracted significant voter attention, or illegal extremist 
organizations, is beyond the scope of this paper.2 
This article is divided into three parts. The first offers a general definition of the 
radical right. It is necessary to provide the explanation of the nature of the phenomenon 
since the character of the radical right influences mutual contacts of its member parties 
and determines barriers to cooperation within this party family. The second part offers 
an introduction to radical right-wing parties in the Visegrád countries; it briefly outlines 
their electoral support, the role they play within the respective party systems, and basic 
ideological features. The third part is dedicated to analyses of mutual contacts of the 
extreme right-wing parties in the studied region and explains factors influencing these 
relations. 
Definition of the Radical Right
The radical right-wing party family has attracted scholars’ attention for several 
decades, with research covering, for example, reasons for electoral support, analyses 
of the ideology and programmes of these parties, attitudes of established political par-
ties towards the radical right, mutual relations of far right-wing parties, etc.  Despite 
2 An in-depth analysis of transnational networks of various types of the extreme right in Central Europe is 
provided by Miroslav Mareš (2006).
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numerous articles and books published on this party family, numerous questions still 
have been left unanswered, and this topic remains the subject of many debates. Schol-
ars have not even agreed on a proper label for this party family and its definition, and 
consequently there is no consensus on which parties should or should not be classified 
as a part of the radical right. As Cas Mudde rightly said, “a large part of the debate on 
whether the party is or is not part of the extreme right-wing party family is, indeed, 
more a result of a difference of opinion on the definition of right-wing extremism” 
(Mudde, 1996: 235). This is true also in the case of Central Europe: the classification 
of some parties as “radical right” can be doubted (let us take the example of the Slovak 
National Party). 
For various reasons defining a radical right-wing party family can be considered 
more difficult to define than other party families. Firstly, the phenomenon of “extreme 
right” has a very diverse and broad nature. It comprises both far-right parties that have 
representatives in the legislature and that seek (or in the case of some parties even 
succeed in gaining) participation in governments, as well as extremist movements and 
groups that fight against the establishment. The extreme right is not a “uniform type 
bearing essentially homogeneous traits”, but it can be described as “a political family 
whose constituent parts exhibit certain things in common, but that also may be divided 
into subtypes” (Hainsworth, 2000: 4–5).3 
Secondly, the parties concerned do not use the name “radical right”. Some party 
families are easier to define since the majority of their members use common names, 
for example, “green”, “communist” or “socialist”. The name criterion cannot be used 
in the case of the extreme right because given the fact that the parties do not admit 
to being classified as radical right, they often refuse to present themselves as being 
right-wing or left-wing, and they define themselves as taking another (third) position 
(Eatwell, 2000: 410; Mudde, 1996: 233). 
Thirdly, these parties clearly exhibit a lack of transnational cooperation. Other 
party families have transnational federations for the cooperation of national parties, 
and the membership of parties in these platforms thus suggests that they belong to that 
respective party family. However, this is not the case with the extreme right (Mudde, 
1996: 233). 
Many names have been used as a label for this group of parties: radical right; ex-
treme right; extremist right-wing parties; populist right; neo-Fascist parties; neo-Nazi 
parties; ultra-right-wing parties; far-right; radical right-wing populist; racist parties; 
etc. (see e. g. Eatwell, 2000: 410, Mudde, 1996: 230–232). However, not all of these 
3 Bearing in mind differences in organizational structures the extreme right, we stress that this article 
is limited to political parties only; other institutional structures such as non-registered movements or 
sub-cultures are not considered. Moreover, the text deals only with the extreme parliamentary right, that 
is, as defined by Jens Rydgren, the section of the extreme right that participates in elections and seeks 
to gain representation within established political institutions, thus accepting the democratic rules of the 
game (Rydgren, 2004: 10). Only those parties that have managed to get their representatives into the 
legislature of the respective country at least for one term, are considered.
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terms are synonyms and should not be used interchangeably. Some of them can be used 
as a label for this party family; some of them are more adequate for various sub-groups 
within this party family.4 Since it is not the aim of this article to contribute to a “war 
of words” (Mudde, 1996) and search for a “proper” name for this party family, there 
is not enough space to define the aforementioned terms and analyse the possibilities 
of their use. It should be mentioned, however, that this article uses mainly the terms 
“radical right”, as well as “far-right” and “extreme right”, which are understood as 
umbrella terms for this heterogeneous phenomenon. These names are considered more 
or less as synonyms and are used interchangeably mainly for stylistic reasons. 
In order to define the radical right-wing party family, it is necessary to outline not 
only ideological and programmatic features, but also to describe its common political 
style and discourse. Scholars tend to agree that the common core doctrine shared by 
the extreme right-wing parties is nationalism (Eatwell, 1998: 412; Mudde, 1999: 187; 
Hainsworth, 2000: 12; Fieschi, 2000: 519), which is usually accompanied by ethno-
centrism and ethnopluralism (i.e. only one’s “own” nation is given positive qualities; 
foreign influences and cultures are perceived as threats to a nation and nations should 
be kept apart in order to preserve their qualities). Other features which are most often 
referred to are xenophobia, racism (usually cultural racism), support for a strong state, 
welfare chauvinism, emphasis on law and order, opposition to multiculturalism and 
immigration, etc.
These parties are usually representatives of populism. Kai-Olaf Lang defines 
populist style as comprising following elements: “the appeal to the “people’s will” and 
a strong anti-establishment attitude; oversimplification of problems and possible solu-
tions; confrontation and antagonism; the construction of a dichotomy between “them” 
(establishment and bureaucracy) and “us” (the people) which cuts across the lines 
of social class and social layer; a high level of personalization based on strong lead-
ers” (Lang, 2005: 7).5 Radical right-wing parties therefore often benefit from popular 
dissatisfaction with established parties (Hainsworth, 2000: 9). These parties appeal 
to emotions (mainly anxiety and insecurity) in their discourse. They overemphasize 
threats, and use stereotypes and prejudice. The representatives of these parties often 
use politically incorrect and socially unacceptable expressions and in some cases cross 
the boundaries of free speech. 
Lang defines two categories of populism, soft and hard. Hard populism is further 
divided into three groups: national-populists; agrarian populists and left-populist. The 
4 For example, Mudde rightly notes that the terms “neo-Nazism” and “neo-Fascism” should be used only 
for parties and groups that consider National Socialism or Fascism as ideological influences (Mudde, 
1996: 230), and thus they should not be used as a label for the extreme right as such.
5 Similarly, far-right parties focus on the “people” or the “ordinary man” in their rhetoric and claim that 
the political system of their respective country does not work (Taggart, 1995: 36–37), they criticize other 
political parties (parties in government as well as the opposition) as being interested only in political 
power and money. This does not necessarily mean that they reject political parties as such: they criticize 
the way parties perform in the political system of their country (Mudde, 1999: 191–192).
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national populist group comprises the Central European far-right parties, and Lang 
(2005: 7–8) mentions namely the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Party of Hungarian 
Truth and Justice (MIÉP), the Czech Republicans and the League of Polish Families 
(LPR) in this group. These parties are subject of this study and will be introduced in 
the following section (the countries are presented in alphabetical order). 
representatives of the radical right in Central Europe
Czech Republic
The only extreme right-wing party ever represented in the Czech parliament in 
the 1990s was the Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslo-
vakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ). 
Its development can be described, according to Miroslav Mareš, in three phases. The 
first started in late 1989 and lasted until the parliamentary elections of 1992. During 
this period the party was established outside parliament and soon started to dominate 
the far right of the political spectrum. Miroslav Sládek became its leading figure. The 
second stage is the period of parliamentary representation, which lasted for six years 
(1992–1998). In the third phase (which began after the 1998 parliamentary elections), 
the party experienced an internal crisis and financial problems and transformed itself 
into the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS). The 
RMS can be considered as the successor of the SPR-RSČ (because there is a clear 
personal and programmatic continuity), but legally it is a new entity (Mareš, 2003: 
187–188). 6  Table 1 shows the electoral support of the SPR-RSČ and the RMS.
Table 1: Electoral support for the SPR-RSČ in parliamentary elections
Year 1990* 1992 1996 1998 2002** 2006
Votes (%) 1.00 5 .98 8.01 3.90 0.97 –
Seats – 14 18 – – –
Source: http://www.volby.cz/(23. 10. 2006)
* 1990 and 1992 Czech National Council elections; 1996, 2002 and 2006 elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
** SPR-RSČ replaced by Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (RMS).
The ideology of the SPR-RSČ was based on nationalism, and the Party presented 
itself as the party of “true patriots and brave people” (Novák, 1995). It emphasized the 
threats posed to the nation that were perceived as being caused by mutual interdepend-
ence among countries which, according to the party, leads to the destruction of national 
cultures, customs and traditions. The SPR-RSČ considered itself as the only party 
that can save the nation (Sládek, 1996). Other ideological features besides national-
ism, included xenophobia and racism. The targets of xenophobic and racist assaults 
6 For more information about the SPR-RSČ “transformation” to the RMS see Mareš, 2003: 200–201.
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were mainly Roma people, whom SPR-RSČ rhetoric referred to as “Gypsies”7. In the 
party’s discourse only negative qualities were attributed to members of this ethnic 
minority; they were associated with crime and seen as an “inadaptable group”. This 
can be demonstrated by the following quotation: “Gypsies are responsible for 70 – 75 
per cent of crime. If we want to lower the crime rate and clean our cities, first we have 
to solve the Gypsy problem” (Sládek, 1996). Other ideological and programmatic fea-
tures were opposition to gay rights and multiculturalism (Mareš, 2003: 210), as well as 
the introduction of capital punishment. The party exhibited strong anti-establishment 
attitudes, e.g. the parliamentary parties between 1998 and 2002 being known as The 
Gang of Five. The Republicans accused the government of corruption and advocated 
direct democracy measures (Mareš, 2003: 222). Nationalism was visible also in the 
case of the foreign policy proposed by the SPR-RSČ, for example, in the opposition 
to NATO and EU membership, and in the strong anti-German rhetoric. Given that the 
leader of the SPR-RSČ became the leader of the RMS, the ideological profile of the 
RMS remained basically unchanged. 
Hungary
The Hungarian Truth and Life Party8 (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) was 
established in 1993 by secession of a group of deputies of the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum. The party was unable to win representation in the 1994 parliamentary elections 
but was more successful four years later when it gained 14 seats in the Hungarian 
legislature (Benda, 2002: 239; Karsai, 1999: 146). The party lost its representation in 
parliament in 2002. Table 2 provides data on the electoral support of the MIÉP. The 
leader of the MIÉP is István Csurka. In 2005 the MIÉP formed an electoral alliance 
with the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik).
Table 2: Electoral support for the MIÉP in parliamentary elections
Year 1994 1998 2002 2006*
Votes (%) 1 .6 5 .5 4 .4 2 .2
Seats 0 14 0 0
Sources:  http://www.parties-and-elections.de/hungary2.html (23. 10. 2006)
http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2006/an/08/8_0.html (23. 10. 2006)
* MIÉP-Jobbik. Percentage of list votes
The MIÉP is also a nationalist party. The “Hungarian truth”, or “Hungarian justice”, 
in the party’s name represents the demands of the MIÉP for the revision of frontiers 
and incorporation of the territories settled by Hungarians, into Hungary. “Hungary 
belongs to Hungarians” is on of the party’s slogans. Hungarian life, culture, values 
systems etc. are perceived as being threatened by global, American-style mass con-
7 The word “Gypsies” is seen as politically incorrect and has pejorative connotations in Czech.
8 The translation “Hungarian Justice and Life Party“ is often used too.
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sumption culture and materialism and from inside by “communist internationalism, 
liberal cosmopolitism and a liberal media monopoly” (Benda, 2002: 240). Ethnic 
nationalism accompanied by xenophobia can be demonstrated also in the following 
example: in 1995 the party leader Csurka “tried to alarm his audience by saying 
that the aim of the governing socialist-liberal coalition is to eliminate pure-blooded, 
true-born Hungarians and replace them with Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews from the 
former Soviet Union, so that, as a result, ‛one third of the country will be Ukrainians, 
Russians, and Jews, and the other third Gypsies’ ” (Karsai, 1999: 137). The MIÉP is an 
anti-Semitic party; anti-Semitism is a component of Csurka’s discourse (Kriza, 2004), 
as well as statements against the Roma minority. The party espouses Euro-scepticism, 
although, according to S. Riishøj, it saw problems related to Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring countries (i.e. in Slovakia and Romania) as more important than EU 
issues (Riishøj, 2004).  József Bayer claims that although the MIÉP cannot be classi-
fied as a neo-Fascist party, it has used some expressions from Nazi vocabulary, such 
as “Lebensraum” or “Judeobolschewiken”. After gaining parliamentary representation 
the party somewhat moderated its rhetoric (Bayer, 2002: 274–275).
Poland
The strongest far-right party in Poland is the League of Polish Families (Liga 
Polskich Rodzin, LPR)9, which was established shortly before the 200110 national elec-
tions that gave the party representation in both parliamentary chambers. The LPR was 
founded with the aim of uniting the Catholic-national right, which was fragmented into 
several small parties and movements, with programmatic as well as personal clashes. 
The effort of uniting this political stream was also supported by Radio Maryja.11 The 
League of Polish Families consists of two main programmatic wings: the first is radical, 
supports orthodox Catholicism, nationalism, opposition to the European Union, often 
with features of anti-Semitism and xenophobia; the second promotes mainly the national 
interests of the Polish Republic. The League of Polish Families has undergone several 
internal conflicts, resulting mainly from its programmatic heterogeneity (Breindl, 2003). 
The party gained representation in the European Parliament in 2004, and one year 
later the LPR kept its representation in the Polish parliament. In 2006 it even became 
a member of government coalition of the Polish republic (together with Law and Justice 
and Self-Defence). The electoral support of the LPR is shown in Table 3.
9 Other members of the extreme right have been rather marginal. It is worth noting that Self-Defence is 
also often included as a member of the far right, but it is more often classified as an example of agrarian 
populism than of the extreme right.
10 The League of Polish Families does not deny it is ideologically inspired by traditionalist authoritarian-
ism (Mareš, 2006: 2). The leader of LPR is Roman Giertych, whose grandfather was an ally of Roman 
Dmowski.
11 Radio Maryja is a controversial conservative Polish radio station, whose founder is Tadeusz Rydzyk. 
It considers itself as a Catholic radio station, but the Vatican and international and Polish media have 
expressed several concerns about the station, whose message is often seen as exhibiting features of 
anti-Semitism, authoritarianism and intolerance.  
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Table 3: Electoral support for the LPR in parliamentary elections
Year 2001 2005
Votes (%) 7 .9 8.0
Seats 38 34
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.de/poland.html (23. 10. 2006)
The League of Polish Families is a nationalist party (for example, we can mention 
a slogan “Poland for Poles” that was used in campaign before the referendum on Polish 
accession to the EU) (Czernicka, 2005: 17). The LPR exhibits clear signs of homo-
phobia; it considers homosexuality as sexual deviance (LPR, undated) and the party 
is often criticized as being anti-Semitic. It is Euro-sceptic – it strongly campaigned 
against Poland joining the EU. According to the League of Polish Families, the main 
reasons for Poland not joining the European Union were: affairs would be managed 
from Brussels; EU laws would take priority over Polish laws and constitution; Polish 
agriculture would be damaged; and sexual deviance, killing of unborn children, eutha-
nasia, cloning, etc. would be permitted (LPR undated). The LPR is strongly populist 
and criticizes the established political élite as being corrupt. Its electoral success can be 
partly explained by protest votes against the political élites (Czernicka, 2005: 17).
Slovakia
The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) was established in 
1990.12 At the beginning of the 1990s the party underwent a period of internal conflicts 
and clashes which were, among others, seen in the change of party leader. In 1994 
the party chose Ján Slota as its head, and he managed to secure its internal stability. 
Having been represented in parliament since 1990, the party even was part of Mečiar’s 
government coalitions (Zetocha – Konečný, 2005). Internal conflicts became once 
more visible in the late 1990s, when Anna Malíková, leader of the parliamentary group 
of the SNS, tried to put an end to political isolation and proposed a more moderate 
party orientation. She replaced Ján Slota as party chair in 1999. Under the leadership 
of Anna Malíková some members of the party (who opposed her) were excluded, and 
others, supporting Ján Slota, left the party. In 2001 the “True Slovak National Party 
was formed under Slota’s leadership. The two parties ran on separate lists for the 2002 
parliamentary elections, and none of them managed to cross the electoral threshold, 
thus losing their parliamentary representation. In the spring of 2005 both parties 
merged again, with Ján Slota being confirmed as leader (Zetocha – Konečný, 2005). 
Parliamentary representation was regained in the 2006 elections, following which 
the party joined Robert Fico’s government coalition (together with Direction-Social 
12 The party sees itself as the oldest political party in Slovakia, as an heir of the Slovak National Party, 
which existed in between 1871 and 1938 and was then forced to become part of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s 
Party. The decision to re-establish the Slovak National Party was taken in 1989. 
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Democracy and the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia). The 
electoral support of the Slovak National Party is presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Electoral support for the SNS in parliamentary elections*
Year 1990** 1992 1994 1998 2002*** 2006
Votes (%) 13 .94 7 .93 5.40 9.07 3 .32 11 .73
Seats 22 15 9 14 – 20
Source: http://www.statistics.sk/ (23. 10. 2006)
*  1990 and 1992 Slovak National Council elections; 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 elections to the Natio-
nal Council of the Slovak Republic
** The True Slovak National Party gained 3.65 per cent of the votes.
*** The True Slovak National Party gained 3.65 per cent of the votes.
The Slovak National Party is a nationalist party, and it warns of the threat of ir-
redentism, which, according to the SNS, is posed by the Hungarian minority living in 
Slovakia. Besides its negative attitudes towards members of the Hungarian minority, 
the party uses strong anti-Roma rhetoric and is also infamous for its homophobic state-
ments – for example, homosexuality is perversion (SNS, 2004) according to Ján Slota. 
The party advocated the re-introduction of capital punishment for serious crimes (SNS, 
1998) and referred to the Slovak State.13 
Transnational relations of the Central European radical right 
As Miroslav Mareš rightly puts it, due to many modern processes (such as the 
growing interconnection of internal and international politics), the transnational coop-
eration of political parties has become more and more important. For them, the main 
reason for maintaining contacts with their foreign counterparts is mutual ideological 
(sometimes also material) support aimed at reinforcing the role of an ideological 
movement within the respective country and region (Mareš, 2006: 6).
Mareš denotes various types of cooperation. According to the number of political 
parties involved, bilateral and multilateral cooperation can be distinguished. Another 
possible criterion is the geographical extent; cooperation can be maintained at the world, 
regional or sub-regional level. The third perspective focuses on the intensity of coop-
eration, in which M. Mareš defines following categories: “1. free, non-institutionalized 
cooperation (often even ad hoc); 2. more stable networks and consistent organizations 
with stable bodies formed from entities at the national level, and 3. transnational organi-
zations forming national branches” (Mareš, 2006: 7, Mareš, 2001b: 8).
13 The Slovak State (1939–45) was a puppet state ally of Nazi Germany. One of the party main goals in 
1998 programme was to present “the true testimony of history of Slovakia and Slovaks, which would be 
purged from intentional falsification and degradation of the Slovak nation and its representatives.” The 
party mentioned that the Slovak State was misunderstood. SNS wanted to rehabilitate the leading figures 
of this country (SNS 1998: 4).
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In order to analyse the mutual relations of the radical right-wing parties in the 
Central European region we will deal with the multilateral cooperation at the European 
level (i.e. the regional level), where platforms for maintaining mutual contacts between 
radical right-wing parties are represented by a project called Euronat and also by EU 
structures, i.e. the possibility to form political groups within the European Parliament14 
and political parties at the European level15. We will assess the intensity of cooperation 
of Central European radical right within these structures. It is important to mention that 
the bilateral relations of the Central European radical right have been rather limited 
and that no sub-regional Central European organization (Mareš, 2006: 14) has been 
founded by them.
Euronat
Euronat was a project advocated by the leader of French National Front Jean-Marie 
Le Pen.  At the party congress in 1997, where representatives of several European 
radical right-wing parties participated, Le Pen suggested the creation of a platform for 
European nationalist parties. According to a report of the Institute for Jewish Policy 
Research, at the 1997 party congress he said, “Why not call this ‘Euronat’– a grouping 
of nationalist parties in Europe“ (JPR, 1999). 
The aim of Euronat was to bring together all nationalist and patriotic parties and 
groups in Europe. It was a rather loose association, with attempts to coordinate the 
joint activities of the political parties concerned. It sought to present an alternative to 
a unified Europe (this alternative was a Europe of nations) and it stated its resistance 
against globalization). The Euronat youth organization Euronat Jeunesse was estab-
lished in 1998, having followed the same ideological principles as Euronat (Ministry 
of the Interior and Ministry of Justice, undated).
Le Pen’s invitation to the party congress, where he suggested launching Euronat, 
was rejected by the majority of Western European radical right-wing parties. However, 
Le Pen was more successful in inviting Central and Eastern European far-right parties 
14 According to the EP rules, “19 Members are needed to form a political group, and at least five Member 
States must be represented within the group”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/stat-
icDisplay.do?id=45&pageRank=4&language=EN (14 November 2006).
15 Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on 
the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding defines 
the political party at the European level in a following way: “(a) it must have legal personality in the 
Member State in which its seat is located;
(b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parli-
ament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must 
have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in 
each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections;
(c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the 
European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;
(d) it must have participated in elections to the European Parliament, or have expressed the intention to 
do so” (EC, 2003).
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to join it. Three of the parties that are the subject of this study had participated in the 
1997 congress:  the Hungarian MIÉP sent its leader, Istvan Csurka; the SPR-RSČ was 
represented by Jan Vik (the party’s Vice-chairman) and Ján Slota represented the SNS 
(Fiala – Mareš, 2000: 15; Mareš, 2001a: 129–130; Mareš, 2003: 264–265; Mareš, 
2006: 11–12). The LPR did not exist at that time and there were no representatives of 
the Polish radical right.
The activities of Euronat developed in 1998 and 1999, however, since then they 
have weakened, although mutual contacts of some of the parties have been still main-
tained (Mareš, 2001a: 129–130, Mareš, 2003: 264–265). Euronat has been more of 
an informal platform for cooperation between nationalist parties; it has not led to the 
institutionalized and transnational organization of these parties. Thus, it represented 
the first level of intensity of transnational cooperation as explained above (loose, non-
institutionalized cooperation). As Mareš mentions, Euronat provided a platform where 
representatives of the Central European radical right could meet; however, they have 
not formed any Central European bloc within this wider project (Mareš, 2006: 14). 
European Union Structures
The accession of the Central European countries to the EU provided a new platform 
for maintaining mutual contacts between political parties, although this platform has 
not been fully exploited by the extreme right. There is no evidence of cooperation 
of the Central European extreme right prior to the 2004 European Parliamentary 
Elections, and we can say that EU membership has not reinforced mutual contacts of 
these parties. The result of these elections also limited the potential cooperation of the 
Central European extreme right because only the League of Polish Families gained 
representation in the European Parliament. Table 5 shows the results of the parties 
concerned.
Currently, the radical right does not form a common political group within the EP16, 
and the various parties representing it are either members of the Union for Europe of the 
Nations (UEN)17, Independence/Democracy group (IND/DEM) or sit as non-attached18 
MEPs. MEPs of the League of Polish Families are split between two groups: some of 
them are part of the Independence/Democracy group, some sit as non-attached MEPS. 
Within the Independence/Democracy group19 the LPR cooperates with other EU critics 
16 The group of the extreme right-wing parties existed in the European Parliament between 1984 and 1994. 
Catherine Fieschi claims that the extreme right-wing parties were unable to work together, and they 
“were never afforded access to the normal channels for cooperation between parliamentary groups nor 
were they given any committee chairs” (2000: 523).
17 The Danish People’s Party and Italian National Alliance. 
18 French National Front, Austrian Freedom Party, Flemish Interest and Italian Social Movement – Fiamma 
Tricolore. 
19 The IND/DEM political programme has the following aims: rejection of the European Constitution, 
rejection of a European Superstate, respect for traditional and cultural values, cooperation between 
sovereign states, respect for national differences and interests (freedom of votes for its delegations) 
(IND/DEM website). 
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and Eurosceptic parties, and two of them are often classified as contemporary radical 
right: the Italian Northern League and the Popular Orthodox Rally from Greece. The 
following sub-section tries to explain why the mutual contacts of the radical right are 
not as intensive as other party families.
Table 5:  The electoral support of the strongest radical right-wing parties 
in the Visegrád Countries in the European Elections in 2004
Country Party Number of votes Percentage of votes Seats
Czech Republic RMS  15 767  0.67 0
Hungary MIÉP  72 177  2 .35 0
Poland LPR 969 689 15 .92 10
Slovakia SNS-PSNS  14 150  2.01 0
Sources: http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pages/elect04.htm (23. 10. 2006)
http://www.volby.cz/ (23. 10. 2006)
http://www.statistics.sk/volbyep2004/ep2004s/obvod/results/tab3.jsp (23. 10. 2006)
Obstacles to mutual cooperation of radical right-wing parties 
Various factors influence the mutual cooperation of the radical right and are ap-
plicable not only in the case of the Central European extreme right but generally to 
cooperation within this party family. The main obstacle to maintaining mutual contacts 
lies in the very nature of the extreme right. As these parties are nationalistic, they do 
not see any benefits resulting from possible international cooperation. Mutual coopera-
tion is very difficult, especially in the case of the existence of historical nationalist 
disputes and where the national interests advocated by various radical right-wing 
parties clash (Mareš, 2001b: 8; Mareš, 2006: 7, 9). Should we use the example from 
the Central European region, it is impossible to imagine that the Hungarian Truth and 
Life Party, which advocates revisionism, could cooperate with the Slovak National 
Party, which is known for its negative attitudes towards the Hungarian minority and 
its rights (perceived, because of its alleged irredentism, as a threat to Slovak unity), in 
Slovakia. Given these fundamentally different views of history, the issue of borders 
and the position of minorities, it is perfectly understandable why there is no bilateral 
cooperation between the MIÉP and the SNS (Mareš, 2006: 9). A similar example of 
clashing nationalist interest is the SPR-RSČ advocating the unity of Czechoslovakia 
and the struggle of the SNS for Slovak independence at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Mareš, 2001b: 8; Mareš, 2006: 9).
The second factor influencing cooperation of the radical right is also found in the 
nature of the phenomenon; it is the heterogeneity of this party family. Its member 
parties embody different strategies in respective domestic politics, and they also prefer 
different strategies regarding maintaining transnational contacts. As a result, various 
radical right-wing parties are interested in different international projects. This is 
visible mainly within EU structures. For example, the League of Polish Families is 
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a member of the IND/DEM group, and as such the LPR might be also involved in the 
Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe20, while the SNS maintains contacts 
with the Union for Europe of the Nations and is considered as an associate member of 
the UEN (see for example the SNS or UEN websites). 
Other factors explaining the rather limited mutual contacts between the Central 
European radical right could be due to the changing success of various parties. Some 
of them become relevant actors only for a limited time, and with the loss of representa-
tion and electoral support they could weaken the emphasis put on their international 
contacts. This is especially visible in the case of the EP – those parties which are not 
represented in the EP do not have to consider which political grouping to join. The RMS 
and the MIÉP thus do not have any link with the parties in the European Parliament.21 
Some of the parties were formed later than others; the League of Polish Families did 
not exist when the MIÉP, the SNS and the SPR-RSČ met the other extreme right-wing 
parties at the FN congress in the 1990s, which makes it impossible to judge whether 
the LPR would or would not be interested in Euronat.
The last factor to be considered is the factionalism of the radical right, which is 
often fragmented even at the national level (Mareš, 2001a: 131). Internal splits and 
conflicts within far-right parties make it difficult for them to be successful at the inter-
national level as well as to pursue coordinated cooperation. Changes in leadership can 
also mean the changes of a preferred strategy. The SNS can serve as an example from 
Central Europe. Under the leadership of Anna Malíková it focused on more moderate 
projects of transnational cooperation, while Ján Slota originally supported Euronat 
(Mareš, 2006: 13). 
Conclusion
In order to assess the mutual contacts and relations of the radical right-wing par-
ties in Central Europe, it is very useful to quote Miroslav Mareš, who concludes that 
although the Central European extreme right-wing parties22 “had met in some Eu-
rope-wide projects (especially Euronat), they never formed anything like a consistent 
Central European bloc within these projects. They haven’t formed their own organiza-
20 There is a lack of information about the Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe (http://www.
adieurope.org/), and from the available information it remains unclear whether this group is funded as 
a political party at the European level. The website indicates the participation of a Polish delegation but 
does not name any particular party or particular members. The leader of the Alliance is Patrick Louis, 
who is a member of the IND/DEM group in the EP.
21 The RMS still considers itself as a member of Euronat. 
22 Miroslav Mareš (2006) categorizes cooperation of Central European extreme right-wing parties 
in three main groups: “protest-transformational” parties, “neo-(clerical) Fascist” projects and 
“neo-Nazi“ networks. The quotation used in this text characterizes transnational contacts of the 
first defined group which basically involves those parties that are described in this article. For 
information on other categories of the extreme right in Central Europe and their mutual contacts 
see Mareš (2006). 
20
tion within East Central Europe and their mutual bilateral relations were relatively 
limited. These parties lacked the need of mutual cooperation. (…) These parties didn’t 
have any collective East Central European identity and therefore didn’t promote it” 
(Mareš, 2006: 14). Mutual contacts have not been significantly reinforced with EU 
membership, and the Central European radical right-wing parties have been involved 
in different projects party groups within the EP and have been interested in different 
projects to form political parties at the European level. 
Thus, the challenge of the radical right posed to democracy and democratic govern-
ance seems to be visible mainly at the national (and sub-national) level. Its parties 
are not creating stable institutions of mutual cooperation in order to promote their 
interests and policies at the regional (Central European) or European level. Further 
development of the European Union and further crystallization of its political parties 
and party system will tell us more about the relations that the Central European radical 
right-wing parties have with conservative, Eurosceptic and right-wing populist parties 
that they join in the UEN or IND/DEM platforms. As these groups do not clearly reflect 
the boundaries of party families, and the extreme right cooperates in these platforms 
with “non-extreme” right-wing parties, this might potentially lead to a moderation of 
their extremist discourse and demands. It is too early, however, to draw any precise 
conclusion. Future research on the behaviour of (not only) the Central European radi-
cal right in European Union structures seems to be necessary.  
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